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COMMENTARY
Criminal Law Codification: Three Hazards
JERRY E. NORTON*
While Europeans have a long tradition of legal codification, running back to the Code Napolean of 1804,1 in the United States true
codification is still a relatively new notion. Lack of familiarity with
codification still causes problems in jurisdictions adopting codes.
No serious codification proposal was made in the United States
until David Dudley Field drafted a New York civil code in the late
nineteenth century. The resulting Field-Carter controversy remains
a classic in the debate over codification.2 While the debate concerning the desirability of adopting a comprehensive general code continued, more humble codification of particular areas of the law,
especially in commercial fields, had a clear beginning at the turn of
the twentieth century. Early codifications of negotiable instrument
law and sales law culminated in the middle of the twentieth century
with the most ambitious American codification to date, the Uniform
Commercial Code. 3
As the popularity of the concept of codification grew in the commercial law area, inevitably its feasibility in other areas of law was
also considered. In the early 1950's the American Law Institute
began its efforts toward the development of a codification of the
criminal laws,4 which resulted in the Model Penal Code in 1962.1
While the work of the American Law Institute [ALl] was in progress, committees in Wisconsin and Illinois were working to propose
criminal codes adopted in 1955 and 1961 respectively.' The Illinois
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago.

1. For a brief history of European codification, see J.
27-34 (1969).
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2. For a discussion of the Field-Carter controversy and for further citations, see E. PArrERSON, JURISPRUDENCE, 421-25 (1953).
3. For a brief history of the codification movement in commercial law, see R. SRmRIE, R.
SUMMERS, & J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL TRANSACrIONS, 16-26 (1st ed.
1969).
4. For discussions of the early organizations of this project, see Wechsler, The Model
Penal Code Project of the American Law Institute, 20 U. KAN. Crr L. Rzv. 205 (1951-52),
and Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HAav. L. Rsv. 1097 (1952).
5. For a discussion of some of the high points and limitations in the finished product, see
Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 594 (1963).
6. See Wisc. STAT., §§ 939 to 949.18 (1975); hL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1-1 to 90-11 (1977);

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 10

Criminal Code utilized some of the concepts proposed in the then
incomplete Model Penal Code Since 1962, a number of states have
adopted criminal codes patterned to a greater or lesser degree on the
American Law Institute model.8 The modern trend toward codification of criminal laws makes a clear understanding of the term
"code" particularly important.
THE MEANING OF "CODE"

The terms "code" and "codification" are sometimes misused as
synonyms for "statute" and "statutory." Thus misused, the terms
"code" and "codification" are frequently attached to that which is
only a compilation of various statutes passed by the legislature at
different times and having potentially different meanings from one
another. A true code, however,
is a pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment of a
whole field of law. It is pre-emptive in that it displaces all other
law in its subject area save only that which the code excepts. It is
systematic in that all of its parts, arranged in an orderly fashion
and stated with a consistent terminilogy, form an interlocking,
integrated body, revealing its own plan and containing its own
methodology. It is comprehensive in that it is sufficiently inclusive
and independent to enable it to be administered in accordance
with its own basic policies
This definition emphasizes that a code is an integrated whole, the
feature that most distinguishes it from a compendium of independent statutes. It suggests that the user of a code must first search
for meaning within the code itself; resort to common law and other
secondary authority comes only after this initial step has been pursued. Although different codifications vary as to how systematic and
comprehensive they are, the principle of comprehensive treatment
remains the same.
THE HAZARDS

Because the codification movement is still new in American law
Comrngrr
(1961).

FoREwoRD, TENATIvE FiNAL DRAr, PROPOSED ILLNOIS REvIsED CRIMINAL CODE

7. See COMMrrrEE FOREWORD, TENTAIVE FINAL DRAr, PROPOSED ILLINois REVISED CRIMINAL CODE (1961).
8. A proposal is currently pending in Congress for the codification of federal criminal laws.
S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). This proposal appears to have departed significantly
from the Model Penal Code.
9. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L. F. 291, 292. See
also People v. Hairston, 46 nI. 2d 348, 356, 263 N.E.2d 840, 846 (1970): "The entire Criminal
Code and each of its sections must be considered in determining the legislative intent ..
"
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it is not surprising that some hazards remain to be uncovered. Cer-

tain problems in criminal law have long been apparent. For example, the codifier must consider whether or not the definition of the
crime, defense, or principle of criminal liability will be politically
acceptable to the legislative body which is to adopt it. The drafter
of a criminal code also continuously faces the hazard that his verbal
articulation of the crime, defense, or principle of criminal liability
might contain an undesired loophole or extension. However, these
hazards have been recognized since the very beginning of the codification movement. Less obvious are particular hazards in the application of the criminal code by working judges and lawyers. 0
Because a new codification usually does not totally alter the criminal law within the adopting jurisdiction, judges and lawyers may
apply it in most cases using much the same terminology and concepts that they used before the code was adopted. Finding that the
end result under the code is much the same as before - the crimes
are likely to have the same names and basically the same elements
- they are also likely to continue to use common law terms and precode attitudes toward statutory construction.
Some of the primary hazards in working with a criminal code may
be illustrated by considering a single recent decision by the Illinois
Supreme Court. Undoubtedly examples could be drawn from any
number of decisions from states which have recently codified their
criminal law. But some of the worst potentials for mischief seemed
to coalesce in this one case.
In People v. White," the defendant was charged with armed robbery. His only defense, intoxication, was rejected by the trial court;
his conviction was affirmed by the appellate court. The decision of
the appellate court and the argument of the State before the Illinois
Supreme Court may be summarized as follows: (1) robbery is a
general intent crime, (2) the intoxication defense is available only
for specific intent crimes, and (3) therefore, the intoxication defense
is not available in a robbery prosecution.
The Illinois Supreme Court accepted the second premise without
discussion, that the intoxication defense is available in prosecutions
for specific intent crimes, but not for general intent crimes. However, the majority disagreed with the first premise, that robbery is
a general intent crime. After reviewing the history of robbery statutes in Illinois together with their interpretations by the courts, the
10. For a discussion of problems in interpreting the first modern criminal law codification,
the Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942, see Michael, Present Problems in Louisiana Substantive Criminal Law, 11 Loy. L. Rav. 71 (1961-62).
11. 67 Ill. 2d 107, 365 N.E.2d 337 (1977).
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majority concluded that robbery and armed robbery are specific
intent crimes. Nevertheless, while the majority would permit the
intoxication defense to be raised, they concluded that the evidence
introduced by the defendant at his trial was insufficient as a matter
of law to negate the intent required for armed robbery.
A further discussion of the court's opinion in the White case may
best be organized in the context of the hazards encountered.
FIRST HAZARD: RETENTION OF PRE-CODE VOCABULARY AND CONCEPTS

To the careful reader of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 who is
otherwise unfamiliar with criminal law, the very statement of the
premises of this appeal would make little sense. "Intent" is defined
by the code," but the terms "specific intent" and "general intent"
are nowhere to be found. They are carry-overs from the pre-code
times.
The continued use of the terms "general intent" and "specific
intent" may largely be the fault of the drafters of the code. They
created a classification of crimes without assigning names inviting
the continued use of older terms which may also carry with them
the freight of obsolete concepts.
The Illinois Criminal Code defines four mental states - intent,
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. 3 Section 4-3(b) provides
that if the statute defining the offense prescribes a particular mental state, that mental state applies to each element of the crime.
This section continues:
If the statute does not prescribe a particular mental state applicable to an element of an offense (other than an offense which involves absolute liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4-4
[intent], 4-5 [knowledge] or 4-6 [recklessness] is applicable.
Using section 4-3(b), one may attempt to classify the crimes in the
code according to the mental element involved. The crime of attempt, for example, requires that it be committed "with intent," so
it is possible to term it an "intent" crime." The statute defining
assault, however, is silent on the mental element required.' Using
section 4-3(b), it is obvious that any of the three mental elements
- intent, knowledge, or recklessness - would satisfy the mental
element of the offense. Should one describe assault as an "intentknowledge-reckless" crime after reading the quoted language from
12.
13.
14.
15.

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-4 (1977).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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section 4-3(b)? Such an awkward description leads to the temptation to use pre-code terminology; "general intent" may serve to
describe an offense such as assault for which no specific mental
element is prescribed. To distinguish these offenses from those such
as attempt, where intent is the prescribed mental state, we may be
tempted to call the latter "specific intent" crimes.
This use of "general intent" to define a concept in the code not
otherwise given a name has utility of convenience. Moreover, there
is some non-code support for using "general intent" to describe a
general minimum mens rea.'6 Unfortunately, the general-specific
intent dichotomy carries with it historical usage beyond its convenience as labeling for code concepts. The more traditional meaning of
general intent was the intent to perform the actus reus,' which has
nothing to do with the mental elements regarding the consequences
of the act. This traditional meaning of general intent is incorporated
elsewhere in the code - the section requiring a voluntary act. 8
Continuing the historical dichotomy, "specific intent" was used to
describe "a special mental element which is required above and
beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of
the crime."'" Used in the traditional sense, neither "general intent"
nor "specific intent" has anything to do with the meaning of
"intent" as it is found in the Illinois Criminal Code. The confusion
caused by this second use of specific intent and general intent is
illustrated by a recent Illinois appellate court opinion which held
battery to be a "specific intent" crime, 20 although the code section
provides that one commits the offense if he acts "intentionally or
2
knowingly." 1
Undoubtedly, some of the continued use of the general-specific
intent dichotomy, especially in the context of the intoxication defense, simply represents a habit of thought carried over by judges
and lawyers from pre-code law. Code drafters could have done much
to avoid the confusion had they supplied a term of art to describe
the general mens rea class. However, the fault does not lie exclusively with the drafters of the Illinois code. As early laborers at
codification, the drafters of the Illinois code had little American
experience to aid them in articulating general principles of criminal
16. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, 201, 202 (1972); J. HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 142-45 (2d ed. 1960).
17.
18.
19.

Id.

20.
21.

People v. Hayes, 37 Ill.
App. 3d 772, 774, 347 N.E.2d 327, 329 (1976).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-3 (1977).

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-1 (1977).
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw, 202 (1972).
CRIMINAL LAW, 762-64 (2d ed. 1969).

See also R.

PERKINS,
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liability. A major source was the unfinished American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, which also lacks a term for the general
22
mens rea.
In its 1970 Study Draft of a New Federal Code, the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws proposed a term
which might have prevented a similar problem in interpreting any
new federal criminal code. Under this proposal, if the statute defining the offense were silent as to the mental element required, the
proof would have to show that the act was done "willfully.",, The
proposal defined' "willfully" to include "intent," "knowledge," and
"recklessness." 2' While one might criticize the use of the term
"willfully," which may carry some undesired traditional freight of
its own, at least the proposal would have included a defined term
of art to describe a concept in the code, without tempting one to
resurrect the specific-general intent dichotomy. Unfortunately, the
proposed Federal Criminal Code now pending before Congress contains no term to define the general mens rea element - "willfully"
or otherwise.
By using the pre-code terms "specific intent" and "general intent," the Illinois Supreme Court in White potentially reintroduced
a concept alien to the meaning of "intent" as defined in the Illinois
Criminal Code.
SECOND HAZARD: READING A CODE ONLY AS A GROUP OF STATUTES

In deciding People v. White, the supreme court had to first determine what mental element is required for the crimes of robbery 2
and armed robbery. 27 The statutes defining these crimes are silent
on this element. It seems apparent from section 4-3(b) that any of
the three mental states - intent, knowledge or recklessness would suffice.
Neither the majority nor the concurring opinion in the White case
discussed the code language. The discussion turned immediately to
the comments of the drafting committee concerning the robbery
section. The words from the committee comments became the focal
point for the majority opinion:
22. The same problem exists in the Louisiana Criminal Code. See Michael, PresentProblems in Louisiana Substantive Criminal Law, Loy. L. REv. 71, 83-87 (1961-62).

23. NATIONAL CoMMIssION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDy DRAFr OF A NEw
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE, § 302(2) (1970).
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. § 302(1)(e).
S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 18-1.
Id., § 18-2.
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This section codifies the law in Illinois on robbery and retains the
same penalty. No change is intended.*** No intent element is
stated as the taking by force or threat of force is the gist of the
offense and no intent need be charged. (See People v. Emerling,
341 Ill. 424, 173 N.E. 474 (1930).28
Writing for the majority in White, Mr. Justice Goldenhersh demonstrated persuasively that the Emerling decision cited by the
drafting committee resulted from a misreading of earlier cases and
statutes. Therefore, the majority concluded that properly read, the
law in existence prior to the new code required intent for the crime
of robbery. And since the legislature intended to bring about no
change, intent is required under the code.
In our opinion, as indicated by the Committee Comments, the
General Assembly, upon enactment of sections 18-1 [robbery]
and 18-2 [armed robbery] of the Criminal Code of 1961, intended
no change in the existing law and there is no indication of a
"legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct
described." We hold that the appellate court erred and that the
intent to deprive the person from whom the property is taken
permanently of its use or benefit is an element of the crimes of
robbery and armed robbery."
It is worthy of note that this language appears to assume that the
choice available is between recognizing intent as an element or imposing absolute liability.
In a special concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Dooley called attention to the problem caused by treating a conclusion in the comments
of a legislative drafting committee as though it were a judicial opinion.
The question before us cannot be resolved on whether the committee improperly cited Emerling as authority for the proposition that
intent need not be charged or proved in a robbery case. The stark
fact is that the committee which drafted the Criminal Code of 1961
did not introduce into sections 18-1 or 18-2 a specific intent requirement. 0
Even more fundamental than the problem suggested by the concurring opinion is the approach to interpretation utilized. In interpreting the robbery sections, the court approaches the problem with
the assumption that the answer is to be found in the language and
28.
ch. 38,
29.
30.

People v. White, 67 Ill. 2d 107, 110, 365 N.E.2d 337, 338-39 (quoting ILL. ANN.
§ 18-1, Comm. Comments (Smith-Hurd 1970)).
People v. White, 67 Ill. 2d 107, 117, 365 N.E.2d 337, 342.
Id. at 125, 365 N.E.2d at 346 (Dooley, J., concurring).

STAn.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 10

history of the code section itself. The code section is viewed as a
single statute in a compilation, not as a part of a comprehensive
legislative package. Other code sections are cited and discussed, but
they are treated almost as secondary authority.
Section 4-3(b) of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 is not a monument to clarity. However, it is probably as clear as similar provisions found in most other codifications. The full utilization of any
code requires that questions of interpretation be approached initially with a presumption that the answers will be found within the
code itself.3 ' Part of the interpretation problem may be attributed
to the fact that there is a long history of calling any compilation of
random penal statutes a "code," even though it does not represent
an organized body of interrelated principles. For example, both
Chapter 38 of the Illinois Revised Statutes and Title 18 of the
United States Code are called criminal codes, although they are
very different in operation and format.
Drafters of codes might alleviate the problem of ignored and overlooked sections dealing with general principles by using a device
utilized in the Uniform Commercial Code - cross references. Such
cross references would emphasize to the user of the code that he is
reading but a part of an integrated whole, encouraging him to first
look for clarification within. Of course, it would also give him direction as to where to look.
THIRD HAZARD: DRAFTERS' COMMENTS

It is axiomatic that when any statute is enacted, the words of the
statute are the law, not the reasons given by the proponent of the
legislation. Comments by the proponents and drafters may be im2
portant in understanding the meaning of the words of the statute,
31. Apparently the Illinois Supreme Court has also overlooked Article 4 of the Criminal
Code in dealing with the offense of attempt murder. Under § 8-4, the crime of attempt is
committed when one, "with intent to commit a specific offense," performs an act in furtherance of that offense. UL. REv. STAT, ch. 38, § 8-4. In People v. Muir, 67 Ill. 2d 86, 365 N.E.2d
332 (1977), the court found that the meaning of "intent" is found in the murder statute: "He
knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that
individual or another." IL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (a)(2). Four months later, in People v.
Trinkle, 68 Ill. 2d 198, 369 N.E.2d 888 (1977), the court reached what appears to be the
opposite conclusion: "It is not sufficient that the defendant shot a gun 'knowing that such
act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm ....
"' Id. at 201, 369 N.E.2d
at 890. The Trinkle decision did not specifically overrule - or even cite - Muir. Although the
central question in both Muir and Trinkle was the meaning of "intent" in the attempt
offenses section, neither case cited or discussed the code section defining intent: ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 38, § 4-4. For a discussion of these and other Illinois cases dealing with this problem,
see W. LAFAvE, MODERN CRiMINAL LAW: CAsEs, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS, 479-85 (1978).
32. The Committee Comments are "a source to which we may properly look in determining the legislative intent" behind the Illinois Criminal Code. People v. Touhy, 31 Ill. 2d 236,
239, 201 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1964).
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but those comments do not replace the meaning of the words in the
statute as the law.33
Nevertheless, comments are simply less soporific to read than
legislative pronouncements. They shed more light on underlying
policy reasons for the rule, and make the premises leading to the
rule more obvious. The reader can also fault commentary, as the
majority opinion in People v. White demonstrates, while it is difficult to argue with a legislative command except on constitutional
grounds. For these reasons, there may be a temptation to interpret
the commentary, rather than the code. In discussing the mental
element in the robbery sections, it is not unfair to suggest that the
majority opinion in the White case adopted as its major legal premise the words in the commentary, "No change is intended." Relying
upon this major premise, the court went on to determine the prior
state of the law which was to be preserved by the code.
The White case demonstrates another instance in which the drafters' comments to the Illinois Code appear to have prevailed over
the language of the code; this involves the effect of voluntary intoxication. The relevant section of the code says that "[a] person who
is in an intoxicated or drugged condition is criminally responsible
for conduct unless such condition . . . (a)[n]egatives the existence
of a mental state which is an element of the offense; . . . . "31 After

criticizing the previous statutory formulation, the committee comment comes to the rather inexplicable conclusion that "[t]he new
Code makes no change in the substantive law as to intoxication but
states the governing principle in a more intelligible form. . . ."
Once again, section 4-3 seems to make it clear that there is a
"mental state which is an element of the offense" 31for every crime,
except for minor offenses which qualify for absolute liability.3 7 Some
crimes, such as attempt, contain a specific mental state in the stat
ute defining the offense. Other crimes, such as assault, lack such
specification. However, this absence does not mean that there is no
"mental state which is an element of the offense." Section 4-3(b)
requires proof of intent, knowledge or recklessness.
33. See, e.g., Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen, 45 Ill. 2d 75, 84, 256 N.E.2d 758, 764 (1970),
where the court stated: "The legislative intent should be sought primarily from the language
used in the statute. Where the language of the act is certain and unambiguous the only
legitimate function of the courts is to enforce the law as enacted by the legislature."
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-3 (1977).
35. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-3, Comm. Comments (Smith-Hurd 1970).
36. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-3 (1977).
37. Under ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-9 (1977), absolute liability exists only if the offense
is a misdemeanor not punishable by incarceration or by a fine in excess of $500, or if the
statute defining the offense clearly indicates such a purpose.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 10

Applying this analysis to the voluntary intoxication section, 3 it
appears that the intoxication defense should be available in all but
absolute liability offenses. In the case of a prosecution for the crime
of attempt, responsibility would be avoided if intoxication prevented the formation of the "intent" which the attempt statute
requires for perpetration of that crime. But it would also annul
responsibility in an assault prosecution if it precluded the defendant
from "consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable
risk," 39 which is required for recklessness - a "mental state which
is an element of the offense" through the application of 4-3(b).
It is interesting to compare the language of the Illinois statute
with that of the Model Penal Code. The Illinois code section provides that an intoxicated person is responsible unless such condition, "negatives the existence of a mental state which is an element
of the offense ....
"40 This provision is not unlike the first subsection of the Model Penal Code section on intoxication: "(1) Except
as provided . . . , intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it
negatives an element of the offense."" The potential for change
which this subsection, standing alone, might possess was not overlooked when it was presented to the American Law Institute in May
of 1959. Consequently, a second subsection was also proposed:"(2)
When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor,
due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he
would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is
immaterial."' 2
The addition of this subsection represented a conscious choice by
the ALI to retain the American practice of recognizing only a limited
defense of intoxication, rather than adopting the English rule of
treating intoxication as one aspect of the overall determination of
mens rea, as advocated by at least one of the ALl Advisory Committee members." No language similar to subsection 2 is found in the
Illinois code, even though the Illinois section was proposed after the
ALl debate.
If the Illinois code makes the defense of intoxication available in
38. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-3(a) (1977).
39. Id. § 4-6.
40. Id. § 6-3(a).
41. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
42. Id.
43. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). Judge Learned Hand objected to the special rule approach. See Wechsler, Foreword, Symposium on the Model Penal
Code, 63 COLUtM. L. Rav. 589, 591 (1963). For the views of an opponent of the Model Penal
Code formulation of the intoxication defense, see Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond,
63 CoLum L. Rav. 594, 599-601 (1963).
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all prosecutions, not just those requiring intent, it does indeed
amount to a change in the law from that which existed prior to its
adoption." Yet one searches in vain among the Illinois decisions for
a discussion of the words of the code. Among the appellate court
decisions, the words of section 6-3(a), defining the intoxication defense, are quoted only in general statements amounting to dictum. 5
Where the defense of intoxication is at issue, the courts have stated
as the operative law the pre-code rule that the defense is available
only for intent crimes. They have even gone a step further to say
that for the defense to apply, the intoxication must be so extreme
as to suspend entirely the power of reason." This latter extention
defines the defense objectively, even though the mental element
involved, intent, is defined by section 4-4 as a subjective mental
4
state. 1
The Illinois Supreme Court has never squarely faced the intoxication defense since the adoption of the new code. In the White case
the language of both the majority and concurring opinions appears
to assume that the defense applies only to "specific intent" crimes.
However, since they found robbery to be a "specific intent" crime,
they did not need to decide whether the intoxication defense applies
to other crimes.
The appellate court decisions limiting the intoxication defense to
intent crimes" have ignored the language of the code. Operationally,
the law has been drawn from the drafters' comments: "The New
Code makes no change in the substantive law as to intoxication. . . . "" In these opinions, as in the White majority's use of the
comments to interpret the robbery statute, the drafters' comments
have taken precedence over the words of the legislation.
Legislative history has long been used as an instrument for statutory interpretation. However, it has generally been relied upon only
where the legislative language is ambiguous; presumably it is never
to be used to alter the clear meaning of the legislative language.5
44. See, e.g., People v. Bartz, 342 Il.56, 67, 173 N.E. 779, 783 (1930).
App. 3d 879, 884-85, 303 N.E.2d 482, 485 (1973).
45. See, e.g., People v. Hunter, 14 Ill.
46. See, e.g., People v. Fleming, 41111. App. 3d 1, 3, 355 N.E.2d 345, 348 (1976).
47. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-4 (1977), provides that a person acts with intent "to
accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when
his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct."
Thus, even if one were to assume that the intoxication defense is limited to intent crimes, it
would appear that the defense would be available whenever intoxication prevents the formation of the "conscious objective or purpose" to accomplish the specific result, whether or not
the power of reason has been entirely suspended.
48. See note 45 supra.
49. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-3, (Smith-Hurd 1970).
50. See note 33 supra.
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The resort to comments by courts may often be attributed to the
habit of approaching statutes as singular pronouncements, rather
than as fragments of a codified whole. Thus, interpreting a specific
statute, a court is likely to turn initially to the comments concerning
the specific statute, rather than to other statutes within the code.
Use of drafters' comments in Illinois is further complicated by the
fact that the comments are not, strictly speaking, legislativeintent.
The committee which drafted the code was made up of distinguished Illinois judges, lawyers and law teachers. In addition to the
proposed code sections, they wrote comments concerning their work.
As distinguished as the committee was, it was not the legislature.
The comments by this committee are thus only the comments of an
interested group of citizens. Only inferentially may they be taken
as the intent or understanding of the legislature; the legislative
pronouncement was the code, not the commentary."
Undue emphasis upon drafters' comments may be a hazard not
easily avoided. Perhaps drafting committees should circulate no
commentary, or if they do so, they should avoid commenting upon
changes which would result. In many instances, however, such solutions would be practically unwise. Commentary is a valuable device
for understanding a codification, especially while it is new, and
before judges and lawyers have had experience in working with it.
Further, the legislature may insist upon some explanation of the
meaning and impact of the proposal. Short of abolishing commentary, a suggestion made earlier might be helpful: if the commentary
includes cross references, anyone relying upon the commentary will
be drawn to other code sections which bear upon the issue involved.
Thus the commentary itself might contain guidelines for its use.
CONCLUSIONS

The codification movement in criminal law is to be welcomed.
With it, the substantive law of crimes has benefited through more
precise definitions not only of the rules defining offenses themselves,
but also of the doctrines and principles of criminal responsibility.
It has also permitted the discarding of some of the more irrational
concepts which have encumbered criminal law. At the same time,
the codifications have not ordinarily included major changes from
common law traditions.
51. Thus, while the reports of such citizen committees may be examined in determining
legislative intent (see note 32 supra), they occupy a.less authoritative position than the
reports of legislative committees. Cases hold that the latter "may be regarded as an exposition
of the legislative intent in a case where otherwise the meaning of a statute is obscure." Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474 (1920).
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The fact that criminal codes have usually resulted in the finetuning of traditional law, rather than complete reconstruction, has
contributed to the hazards discussed above. Had the codes completely revamped the vocabulary and concepts of criminal law,
judges and lawyers would probably have been more aware of the
need to reconsider their assumptions in light of changes in legislative formulation. Because vocabulary and concepts are not completely altered in the new codes, most cases are resolved in the same
way used prior to codification, apparently making detailed examinations of code sections unimportant. As a result, code sections
inconsistent with prior law are likely to be ignored or simply overlooked.
Of course, judges and lawyers should be admonished to read a
code as an unified whole, not as a compendium of legislative miscellania. But drafters of codes and those charged with writing code
commentary should also be aware of the hazards in applying these
relatively new inventions. As legislative drafters they may do so by
making certain that each important concept is identified by a term
of art, even if they must invent a term to identify a concept which
differs from the traditional one. Definitional sections prominently
placed may also encourage the user to refer first to the code for
meaning.
Drafters of commentary could aid the user by suggesting other
code sections relevant to statutory construction. A useful model
may be the Uniform Commercial Code comments, which typically
list cross references and definitional cross references.
Finally, it may help to avoid the erroneous use of drafters' comments if the drafters of commentary avoid stating that no change
is intended when, in fact, the wording of the statute has been
changed. Such words in the commentary, at least in the Illinois
experience, may assume greater importance than the code section
itself. Again, the Uniform Commercial Code comments may be instructive .5

The benefits of criminal codes are many. The organized, rational
exposition of the substantive criminal law may avoid many of the
uncertainties, inconsistencies and undue technicalities which have
plagued the common law of crimes. Not only may these benefits be
lost by the improper use of codes, but the law may be made worse
52.

See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-106 Comment. Following citation to the prior statute, the com-

ment continues:
Changes: Reworded:
Purposes of Change: The new language is intended to clarify doubts arising under
the original section as to .

...
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than if codes had not been adopted at all. If readings of legislative
pronouncements and judicial opinions lead to opposing conclusions,
one may wonder whether clarity and rationality would not better be
served by repealing the legislation. For codes to be beneficial, they
must be followed; to be followed, they must be understood.
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